Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking Sites by Richards, Robert D.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 6
9-1-2009
Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First
Amendment Interests, Reputational Harm, and
Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking
Sites
Robert D. Richards
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs
and Social Networking Sites, 8 First Amend. L. Rev. 176 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol8/iss1/6
SEX, LIES, AND THE INTERNET:
BALANCING FIRST AMENDMENT
INTERESTS, REPUTATIONAL HARM, AND
PRIVACY IN THE




When Matt Ivester, founder and chief executive of the now-
defunct Juicy Campus,' addressed a packed gathering of George-
town University students in October 2008-the first time he faced
such an audience-he bluntly told the crowd: "The fact is, the
Internet is changing privacy as we know it."'2 Amid student con-
cerns that his website, which "encourages people to post gossip
anonymously ...naming names and spreading detailed rumors
about sex, drugs, [and] college life," 3 could adversely affect their fu-
ture careers, particularly those hoping to enter government service,
Ivester offered little comfort, telling the group that employers are
"going to have to start developing a sense of humor.",4
* John & Ann Curley Professor of First Amendment Studies and Founding
Director of the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at The Pennsyl-
vania State University. B.A., 1983, M.A. 1984, Communication, The Pennsyl-
vania State University; J.D., 1987, The American University. Member, State
Bar of Pennsylvania.
1. A Juicy Shutdown, http://www.juicycampus.blogspot.com (Feb. 4,
2009, 11:47 EST) (the site now includes 500 campuses).
2. Susan Kinzie, Juice, the Whole Juice and Nothing but the Juice, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 2008, at B1 (describing JuicyCampus as "the fast-growing gossip
Web site ... that is igniting controversies on campuses across the country.").
3. Id.
4. Id.
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JuicyCampus was a relative newcomer-launched in Octo-
ber 2007-to a growing number of online, anonymous posting op-
portunities that often provide open invitations to ventilate freely
about such things as "the campus' most attractive students, biggest
drug users and popular places for illicit sexual activity"5 or, in the
case of blogs outside academic circles, the political battle of the
day.6 In February 2009, Ivester announced that he was shutting
down the controversial site, citing declining "ad revenue because of
the bad economy" as the reason.7 Visitors to JuicyCampus were
"redirected to a site called College Anonymous Confession Board,
whose owner said he hosts 'a higher level of discourse."' 8
On college and university campuses, those taking classes are
not the only ones who may unwittingly face online wrath. Both sat-
isfied and dissatisfied students can make their feelings known-
anonymously, that is-on Rate My Professors,' a user-friendly ser-
vice that enables posters to exalt or excoriate instructors with ease.
Such ratings are not limited to higher education. Students and par-
ents similarly may post comments about K-12 teachers on a sister
site, Rate My Teachers.10
5. Connie Parham, 'Juicy' Georgetown: Scandalous Site Hits Campus,
THE HOYA (Georgetown University), Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.thehoya.com/
news/j uicy-georgetown.
6. See, e.g., Daily Kos, About Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/special
/about2 (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) (noting the website "is the premier online
political community with 2.5 million unique visitors per month"); Huffington
Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009) (inviting visi-
tors to blog by saying "If you have something to say. . . Say it on the Huffing-
ton Post"); Politico, http://www.politico.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009) (listing
four blogs from which visitors can choose).
7. Deborah Gage, Internet Chatter Drawing Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
9, 2009, at Al (noting that "the site also had been scrutinized by several state
attorneys general and had some of its posters sued last year by a University of
Delaware student who wanted gossip about herself removed from the site").
8. Id.
9. Rate My Professors, http://www.ratemyprofessors.com (last visited
Sept. 5, 2009) (boasting "[o]ver 6000 Schools, 1 million professors, 8 million
opinions").
10. Rate My Teachers, http://www.ratemyteachers.com (last visited Sept.
5, 2009).
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In addition to blogs, social networking sites-notably
MySpace," Facebook,' 12 and Twitter"3-are burgeoning throughout
cyberspace. 14 The popularity of these sites perhaps was nowhere
more evident than during the 2008 presidential election. As the
Los Angeles Times reported,
Without a doubt, the election was a high-water
mark for activity on the Web. Not only did
news sites see record traffic-latimes.com had
its best day ever with more than 8.2 million
page views Tuesday-but marquee new media
communities such as Twitter, YouTube, Face-
book and Digg hummed from morning to
night.15
The news media clearly are no strangers to the blogosphere
and are working on new ways to attract audiences to their web-
sites." While hosting online blogs provides a convenient way for
11. MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009) (invit-
ing visitors to "[j]oin for free, and view profiles, connect with others, blog,
rank music, and much more!").
12. Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009) (de-
claring that "Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your
life").
13. Twitter, http://twitter.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009) (stating that
"[a]t Twitter, we ask one question, 'What are you doing?' . . . The result of us-
ing Twitter to stay connected with friends, relatives, and coworkers is that you
have a sense of what folks are up to").
14. See generally JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 1 (2008) (not-
ing that people born after 1980 are "Digital Natives" and, as such, "[t]hey all
have access to networked digital technologies. And they all have the skills to
use those technologies.").
15. David Sarno, The 2008 Election Web Scout; A Logjam of Voting
Chatter, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at El (observing that "[a] generation of
Web users was busy taking video, sharing personal stories, offering commen-
tary and generally showing that just watching an election is no longer the op-
timal way to participate in one").
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Saba, Time Has Come Today, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Oct. 16, 2008, at 44 (noting that "newspapers continue to beef up
their sites with allurements-videos, blogs, user-generated content, and the
like").
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readers and viewers to connect with the media and each other, it
also reveals some useful personal information on which media or-
ganizations can base business decisions. As Broadcasting & Cable,
a leading trade publication for electronic media, reported in Sep-
tember 2008, "[a]udience listening is possible because social Web
sites, chat rooms, e-mail, blogging and other forms of personal ex-
pression in digital media are easily data mined.
1 7
With the proliferation of user-generated content-much of
it anonymous-comes a social cost in terms of protecting reputa-
tion, privacy, and sometimes even physical safety in an online
world. In November 2008, a nineteen-year-old community college
student in Pembroke Pines, Florida, committed suicide on a live
video website, "'egged on' by strangers who, investigators say, en-
couraged him to swallow the antidepressant pills that eventually
killed him.,
18
That same month a Missouri woman, Lori Drew, was con-
victed by a federal jury in California of "three misdemeanor counts
of computer fraud for having misrepresented herself on the popular
social network MySpace."19 Drew, pretending to be a teenage boy,
first sent "friendly and then menacing messages to Megan Meier,
13, who killed herself shortly after receiving a message in October
17. Robert Marich, Audience 'Listening' May Eventually Drive Ad-Spend
Decisions, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 22, 2008,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/115540- AudienceListeningMay
_EventuallyDriveAdSpendDecisions.php?q=audience+listening+may+ev
entually+drive+ad+spend+decisions (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). Data mining,
the process of finding patterns in data, is commonly used for profiling and
marketing purposes. See Oracle, Oracle Data Mining: Powering Next-
Generation Predictive Applications, http://www.oracle.com/technology/
products/bi/odm/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) ("Data analysts can...
explore their data to find patterns, relationships, and hidden insights.").
18. Brian Stelter, Web Suicide Viewed Live and Reaction Spur a Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at A16 (noting that "[l]ive video of the death was
shown online to scores of people, leading some viewers to cringe while others
laughed").
19. Brian Stetler, Guilty Verdict in Cyberbullying Case Provokes Many
Questions over Online Identity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A28 (suggesting
that "[t]here are legitimate reasons to hide one's name and other information
online, be it concern about identity theft or a need for comfort when asking
for advice or help").
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2006 that said in part, 'The world would be a better place without
you."' 20 The conviction came under a statute that had "been used
almost exclusively to prosecute hacker crimes, 21 and rested on the
terms of service on MySpace, which require posters, when register-
ing, to be truthful and accurate.
Drew's conviction has raised the question whether online
terms of service agreements, often clicked but largely ignored by
users, will become the basis for redefining criminal law. Andrew M.
Grossman, a legal policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, noted
at the time of the Drew conviction that the verdict "means that
every site on the Internet gets to define the criminal law .... What
used to be small-stakes contracts become high-stakes criminal pro-
hibitions.,
22
Even the judge in Drew's case was troubled by the way this
particular law was applied against her. On July 2, 2009, U.S. Dis-
trict Judge George H. Wu acquitted Drew, because "the federal
statute was too 'vague' when applied in this case and ... were he to
allow Ms. Drew's conviction to stand, 'one could literally prosecute
anyone who violates a terms of service agreement' in any way.,
23
With the issue of Internet anonymity bubbling up in courts
and legislatures across the country, a showdown between reputa-
tion, privacy, and safety interests on the one hand, and the First
Amendment rights of message posters and online service providers
on the other, is inevitable.
What happens if an anonymous poster on Rate My Profes-
sors, MySpace, or a newspaper's blog levels a defamatory remark or
20. Id.
21. Id. (noting that "Ms. Drew's creation of a phony profile amounted to
'unauthorized access' to the site, prosecutors said, a violation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986").
22. Id.
23. Rebecca Cathcart, Conviction is Tossed Out in MySpace Suicide
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, at A14 (noting that "the United States attorney
in Los Angeles, Thomas P. O'Brien, who brought the case, said a dismissal
would leave open the possibility of an appeal"). See also United States v.
Drew, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85780 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009) (granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague).
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invades the privacy of an identifiable person? Should the service
itself be held legally accountable? As the law currently stands, the
entity that provides the forum, for the most part, is immune from
liability flowing from third-party content under § 230(c), the so-
called "Good Samaritan" provision, of the Communications De-
cency Act (CDA).24 In other words, the law protects those who
merely distribute content supplied by others. But the law in this
area is not completely settled. In 2008, for instance, two federal
courts of appeals differed as to the extent of the immunity that
should attach to the Internet Service Provider (ISP).
In Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc. ,25 the Seventh Circuit ruled that the online
advertising service Craigslist did not violate federal fair housing
laws when it allowed posters to place discriminatory restrictions on
offers of housing based upon classifications of race, religion, or
gender. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in Fair Hous-
ing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
2 6
found the roommate locator service violated anti-discrimination
laws because users answered a preference questionnaire that was
provided by the online service-an instrument the court found to
elicit information that, in effect, created discriminatory postings.
Doing its best to keep ISP protection in place, the court wrote,
"[t]he message to website operators is clear: If you don't encourage
illegal content, or design your website to require users to input ille-
gal content, you will be immune."27 Both cases will be discussed
more fully below.28
24. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). For a dis-
cussion of the development and early challenges to the Act, see ROBERT D.
RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE: THE PERILOUS PRESENT AND UNCERTAIN
FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 79 (1998) (noting that the Citizen Internet
Empowerment Coalition, one of the early legal challengers, "proclaimed that
the outcome of this lawsuit 'will likely determine the legal status of speech on
the Internet and the future of the First Amendment in the Information
Age').
25. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
26. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
27. Id. at 1175.
28. See infra notes 87-102 and accompanying text.
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Craigslist may have escaped liability in Lawyers' Committee,
but that case did not end its legal problems. In March 2009, Cook
County, Illinois Sheriff Thomas Dart filed a federal lawsuit against
the service, claiming that "Craigslist is the single largest source of
prostitution in the nation. '' 29 The litigation arose from an unmoni-
tored section of Craigslist advertising "Erotic Services."3 The sec-
tion contains advertisements for "erotic massage, strippers, [and]
escort services."31  Craigslist is expected to raise § 230 as a de-
fense.32
Even if immunity attaches to the ISP, can the third-party
poster be held liable for violations of law? The short answer is yes,
but there is a dilemma. If the poster is anonymous, can the service
provider be forced to reveal identifying information about the
poster, thereby undercutting the concept of anonymous speech?
That question was an issue of first impression before Maryland's
highest court. The Maryland Court of Appeals heard arguments in
December 2008 "[i]n a First Amendment case with implications for
everything from neighborhood e-mail lists to national newspa-
pers., 33 A Dunkin' Donuts franchise owner from Maryland's East-
ern Shore alleged that he was defamed by an anonymous comment
posted on NewsZap.com that described his store "as one 'of the
most dirty and unsanitary-looking food-service places I have
seen."' 3 4 As the Washington Post described the oral argument,
"[f]or advocates of strong protections for anonymous speech and
29. See John Koopman, Suit Alleges Craigslist Ads Promote Prostitution,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 6, 2009, at B1 (noting that the sheriff contends that
"[m]issing children, runaways, abused women and women trafficked in from
foreign countries are routinely forced to have sex with strangers because




33. Henri E. Cauvin, Maryland Court Weighs Internet Anonymity, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at B1 (noting that the case marks "the first time the Mary-
land Court of Appeals has confronted the question of online anonymity, an
issue that has surfaced in state and federal courts over the past few years as
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the Internet, online chat rooms are the 21st-century successors to
the town square and the political pamphlet.
' 35
In February 2009, Maryland's Court of Appeals ruled that
the trial judge "abused his discretion when ordering the identifica-
tion of the five anonymous Internet forum participants, because the
three participants sued, concededly, did not make the alleged de-
famatory statements, while the other two anonymous participants,
who allegedly made the actionable remarks, were not sued by [the
plaintiff]. 36
Without question, courts are grappling with a dizzying array
of issues arising out of blogs and social networking sites. As the
cases proliferate, courts are beginning to parse the protection ac-
cording to subtle nuances in fact patterns, which invites the ques-
tion: just how long will it be before the legal levee breaks and the
immunity-prized at least in the view of First Amendment advo-
cates-is narrowed by court interpretation or legislative revision?
Such a result would have a profound effect, not only on future
online development, but also on First Amendment jurisprudence.
This article examines the legal evolution of online posting
through blogs and social networking sites and the simultaneous de-
velopment of ISP immunity through § 230, concluding ultimately
that the area is ripe for reform that should seek to balance personal
harms and First Amendment interests. Part I of this article traces
the development of ISP immunity under federal law, along with
litigants' attempts to circumvent it in the early stages of the law.37
Part II examines the rash of recent cases involving questions of
third-party postings and suggests that courts may soon grow weary
of blanket immunity in light of increasingly egregious fact patterns
and calls for reform.38 Part III analyzes the critical issue whether an
ISP can be forced to provide identifying information about its
anonymous posters, thus threatening a historical tradition in our na-
tional commitment to free speech principles.39 The article con-
35. Id.
36. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 435 (Md. 2009).
37. See infra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 68-102 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 103-67 and accompanying text.
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cludes in Part IV by suggesting a pragmatic revision of § 230 immu-
nity that balances First Amendment interests with individual rights
to redress real injuries through litigation.4°
I. SECTION 230: CONSTRUCTING A WALL OF PROTECTION
Prior to CDA § 230, courts were left to apply traditional
publisher liability to online content.4' A central variable of such li-
ability was how much control the online provider exercised over
third-party content. In Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., a
New York court ruled that an online service provider acted as a
publisher "[b]y actively utilizing technology and manpower to de-
lete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offen-
siveness and 'bad taste. ' ' 41 In the court's view, the fact that the ser-
vice used both technological and human screening of online
postings constituted editorial control.43
The court observed:
That such control is not complete and is en-
forced both as early as the notes arrive and as
late as a complaint is made, does not minimize
or eviscerate the simple fact that PRODIGY
has uniquely arrogated to itself the role of de-
termining what is proper for its members to
post and read on its bulletin boards. 44
The battle lines were drawn early as to when liability at-
taches. Post-Stratton Oakmont, a series of cases, bolstered by the
newly enacted CDA § 230, helped establish the pivotal distinction
between a distributor of information and an online publisher. One
such case-a $30 million defamation lawsuit -involved a high-level
40. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
41. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications De-
cency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133.




SEX, LIES, AND THE INTERNET
White House official and one of the country's early leaders in
online service.
Sidney Blumenthal, an aide to then-President Bill Clinton,
and his wife sued online gossiper Matt Drudge and America Online
(AOL) for defamation after Drudge reported falsely that "[n]ew
White House recruit Sidney Blumenthal has a spousal abuse past
that has been effectively covered up.
45
As the Washington Post reported AOL's position at the
time, "[t]he company believes it is protected by language buried
deep in Section 230 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
states, 'No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.' 46 The company was
correct in its belief. As it turned out, the language of § 230 would
be trotted out many times in subsequent cases.
U.S. District Judge Paul L. Friedman wrote in Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 
47
The near instantaneous possibilities for the dis-
semination of information by millions of differ-
ent information providers around the world to
those with access to computers and thus to the
Internet have created ever-increasing opportu-
nities for the exchange of information and ideas
in "cyberspace." This information revolution
has also presented unprecedented challenges
relating to rights of privacy and reputational
rights of individuals, to the control of obscene
and pornographic materials, and to competition
among journalists and news organizations for
instant news, rumors and other information
that is communicated so quickly that it is too
45. Linton Weeks, The Tangled Web of Libel Law: Suit Raises Questions
of AOL's Function, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1997, at Al (asking "[i]s a malicious
untruth posted on the Internet libelous? And if so, who is responsible for the
action?").
46. Id.
47. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
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often unchecked and unverified. Needless to
say, the legal rules that will govern this new
medium are just beginning to take shape.48
Judge Friedman was correct in his forecast that this bur-
geoning area of the law would need to be sorted out over time. For
his part, Friedman empathized with the Blumenthals, who argued
that Drudge was different from an anonymous poster who simply
used AOL as a conduit. Indeed, Drudge was paid by AOL and
touted by the service. 49 But in the end, the court noted that Con-
gress intended to provide a wide degree of latitude to ISPs. In so
ruling, Judge Friedman observed,
But Congress has made a different policy
choice by providing immunity even where the
interactive service provider has an active, even
aggressive role in making available content
prepared by others. In some sort of tacit quid
pro quo arrangement with the service provider
community, Congress has conferred immunity
from tort liability as an incentive to Internet
service providers to self-police the Internet for
obscenity and other offensive material, even
where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not
even attempted.5 °
Clearly, Congress recognized the potential of the fledgling
medium and did not want to impede its development, finding in the
CDA that "[t]hese services offer users a great degree of control
over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for
even greater control in the future as technology develops."51 In
carving out immunity for service providers, lawmakers hoped "to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently ex-
48. Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 51 (noting "AOL [promoted] Drudge to its subscribers and po-
tential subscribers as a reason to subscribe to AOL").
50. Id. at 52.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2) (2006).
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ists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfet-
tered by Federal or State regulation.""
In many respects, Congress's plan for the Internet had been
validated by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals five months be-
fore Blumenthal in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.53
Kenneth Zeran was the subject of an anonymous online
prank that caused him massive problems. An unidentified user
posted Zeran's name and home telephone number on an AOL bul-
letin board, offering for sale "shirts featuring offensive and tasteless
slogans related to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City ' 54 and inviting people
to call and order. After Zeran experienced a high volume of angry
calls, including death threats, he reported the incident to both AOL
and law enforcement authorities.15 To make matters worse, an
Oklahoma City radio station obtained a copy of the AOL posting
and read it on the air-further urging listeners to inundate Zeran
with angry phone calls. 56 Zeran sued AOL, which answered his
complaint with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, relying on §
230. The district court agreed with AOL that the CDA provision
barred Zeran's claims.57
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed that Zeran could not pur-
sue claims against AOL because of the federal statute. The court
noted that "[t]he specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific
speech would have an obvious chilling effect., 58 The unanimous
court also found Congress's rationale to be highly transparent, writ-
ing:
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not
difficult to discern. Congress recognized the
threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom
52. Id. § 230(b)(2).
53. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
54. Id. at 329 (describing how "[t]hose interested in purchasing the shirts




57. Id. at 330.
58. Id. at 331.
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of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet
medium. The imposition of tort liability on
service providers for the communications of
others represented, for Congress, simply an-
other form of intrusive government regulation
of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to
maintain the robust nature of Internet commu-
nication and, accordingly, to keep government
interference in the medium to a minimum.59
The court also dismissed Zeran's argument that AOL was
put on notice of the posting and thereby lost the immunity granted
under § 230.60 The panel pointed out the flaws inherent in this ar-
gument, writing:
More generally, notice-based liability for inter-
active computer service providers would pro-
vide third parties with a no-cost means to cre-
ate the basis for future lawsuits. Whenever one
was displeased with the speech of another party
conducted over an interactive computer ser-
vice, the offended party could simply "notify"
the relevant service provider, claiming the in-
formation to be legally defamatory. In light of
the vast amount of speech communicated
through interactive computer services, these
notices could produce an impossible burden for
service providers, who would be faced with
ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial
speech or sustaining prohibitive liability.61
In Zeran's case, the online "prank" escalated beyond mere
inconvenience to a point where his physical safety was in jeopardy.
59. Id. at 330.
60. Id. at 332.
61. Id. at 333 (suggesting further that "[b]ecause the probable effects of
distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider
self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we will not
assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact").
[Vol. 8
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Still, the courts refused to tamp down the immunity that Congress
had set forth for online service providers.
Similarly, even when the online misconduct interferes with
the operation of a business, courts traditionally have upheld § 230
protection, despite the problems caused, as the next pair of cases
illustrates.
In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. America Online,
62Inc., a publicly traded computer finance software manufacturer
sued AOL for defamation and negligence for publishing incorrect
stock price and share volume information on three occasions.63
AOL had contracts with ComStock and Townsend, two independ-
ent stock quote providers, to supply the financial information AOL
posted on its "Quotes & Portfolios service area." 64
The plaintiff argued that AOL was not entitled to § 230
immunity because it exceeded the bounds of merely providing
online service when it "worked so closely with ComStock and
Townsend in the creation and development of the stock quotation
information. '' 65  That close working relationship amounted to
AOL's notifying the stock quote providers when it learned of incor-
rect information. The court was not convinced. Writing for a
unanimous panel, Circuit Judge Bobby R. Baldock noted, "[w]hile
Defendant did communicate with ComStock and Townsend each
time errors in the stock information came to its attention, such
communications simply do not constitute the development or crea-
tion of the stock quotation information., 66 Moreover, the contract
governing the relationship between the stock quote providers and
AOL "specifically provided that 'AOL may not modify, revise, or
change' the information which ComStock provided.,
67
62. 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).
63. Id. at 983.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 985.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 986.
20091
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II. CRACKS IN THE WALL: How SAFE IS SECTION 230's BLANKET
IMMUNITY?
The most recent cases in this area reveal almost complete
reliance on § 230 to resolve any dispute in which the ISP is impli-
cated. This raises the question whether mounting pressure-
particularly in light of increasingly egregious fact patterns and calls
by some legal scholars to revisit the law 68-eventually will result in
congressional action to reduce the blanket safeguard or judicial
narrowing of the scope of protection. It is instructive to examine
some of the more recent actions to develop a sense of how pivotal
the protection is to the conduits of online information, just how far
courts have been willing to extend the line between ISP and infor-
mation content provider, and whether such extension invites criti-
cism and supports advocates seeking to rein in § 230.
In January 2009, a U.S. district court in Texas ruled in favor
of the operators of a website called "The Rip-Off Report,, 69 a fo-
rum that permitted third parties to voice complaints about compa-
nies. GW Equity, a mergers and acquisitions consulting group,
sued Xcentric Ventures, claiming the company and its manager
"published defamatory reports about [it] on their websites, and de-
veloped, wrote, created, edited, and published information con-
tained in the titles and headings of the reports."7 The latter point
was emphasized by the plaintiff as a means of transforming Xcen-
tric Ventures, for purposes of its lawsuit, from a mere service pro-
vider to an information content generator not subject to § 230 pro-
tection.
GW Equity argued that content monitors working for Xcen-
tric Ventures "created and developed titles and headings to the
published reports regarding [it]."71 Xcentric Ventures disputed that
68. See, e.g., PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 14, at 106 (arguing that
"[t]he scope of the immunity the CDA provides for online service providers is
too broad").
69. GW Equity L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures L.L.C., No. 3:07-CV-976-O,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1445 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009).
70. Id. at *3.
71. Id. at *4.
[Vol. 8
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allegation, prompting GW Equity to claim summary judgment was
inappropriate because a genuine issue as to a material fact existed
in the case.12 The district court disagreed. Despite testimony be-
fore a U.S. magistrate judge in an earlier proceeding that some con-
tent monitors added geographical information to the titles of the
reports, the district court found such additional content was not
enough to establish liability on the part of the ISP. 73 The court ob-
served:
Thus, even if Plaintiff could prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Defendants added
geographical information to the allegedly dis-
paraging titles of the disparaging reports at is-
sue in this case, the Court finds the addition of
geographical information alone would not be
sufficient for Defendants to be liable for defa-
mation/libel, interference with business rela-
tionship, business disparagement under Texas
law, disclosure of trade secrets and confidential
information, and civil conspiracy as a matter of
law.1
4
To this point, the district court also noted that "[u]nder the
CDA, website operators are only considered 'information content
providers,' for the information at issue that the operators are re-
sponsible for creating or developing. 7 ' The court also was in ac-
cord with a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision eight months
earlier which noted that "[c]ourts have construed immunity under
the CDA broadly in all cases arising from the publication of user-
generated content.
76
The Fifth Circuit in Doe v. MySpace77 refused to allow a
user of the social networking site to recover damages from the ISP
for its alleged failure "to implement basic safety measures to pre-
72. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
73. GW Equity, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1445, at *21.
74. Id. at *22.
75. Id. at *21 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at *8 (citing Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)).
77. 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
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vent sexual predators from communicating with minors on its Web
site."78  "Julie Doe," thirteen years old at the time, created a
MySpace profile, lying about her age and claiming to be eighteen.7 9
Because of her misrepresentation, her profile went public, and she
was contacted by nineteen-year-old Pete Solis, who subsequently
met her in person and sexually assaulted her.80
In their action against the ISP, claiming negligence and
gross negligence, the plaintiffs argued that § 230 was inapplicable
"because their claims do not implicate MySpace as a 'publisher'
protected by the Act and because MySpace not only published but
was also partially responsible for creating the content of the infor-
mation that was exchanged between Julie and Solis. ' 81 With re-
spect to the Does' argument that their case was "predicated solely
on MySpace's failure to implement basic safety measures to protect
minors," the court of appeals agreed with the district court's rejec-
tion of the claim, noting the lower tribunal's finding:
The Court, however, finds this artful pleading
to be disingenuous. It is quite obvious the un-
derlying basis of Plaintiffs' claims is that,
through postings on MySpace, Pete Solis and
Julie Doe met and exchanged personal infor-
mation which eventually led to an in-person
meeting and the sexual assault of Julie Doe. If
MySpace had not published communications
between Julie Doe and Solis, including per-
sonal contact information, Plaintiffs assert they
78. Id. at 416.
79. Id. The court noted:
MySpace.com membership is free to all who agree to the
Terms of Use. To establish a profile, users must represent
that they are at least fourteen years of age. The profiles
of members who are aged fourteen and fifteen are auto-
matically set to 'private' by default, in order to limit the
amount of personal information that can be seen on the
member's profile by MySpace.com users ....
Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 417.
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never would have met and the sexual assault
never would have occurred. No matter how
artfully Plaintiffs seek to plead their claims, the
Court views Plaintiffs' claims as directed to-
ward MySpace in its publishing, editorial,
and/or screening capacities.82
The Does' other argument, that MySpace was partially re-
sponsible for the content (and thus an information content provider
under § 230), was based on the fact "that it facilitates its members'
creation of personal profiles and chooses the information they will
share with the public through an online questionnaire.. The court
of appeals found no basis for such a finding, choosing instead to
rely upon the broad swath of protection that courts traditionally
have afforded ISPs. The court observed that "[p]arties complaining
that they were harmed by a Web site's publication of user-
generated content have recourse; they may sue the third-party user
who generated the content, but not the interactive computer service
that enabled them to publish the content online."84 Nevertheless,
the remedy of suing the third-party content generator is viable only
if that party is identified.
The Does petitioned the Supreme Court for review, but cer-
tiorari was denied.85 In their Reply in Support of Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, the petitioners argued,
This case vividly demonstrates the need for the
Court to reign in the overly expansive jurispru-
82. Id. at 419-20 (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849
(W.D. Tex. 2007)).
83. Id. at 420. The court noted:
The Does also contend that MySpace's search features
qualify it as an "information content provider," as defined
in the CDA: "The term 'information content provider'
means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service"
Id. (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 419.
85. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 600 (2008).
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dence that has culminated in the Fifth Circuit's
finding Section 230 to be a fount of boundless
immunity and confirm the correctness of the
Seventh Circuit's restrained view, which appro-
priately respects statutory text, congressional
purpose, and state sovereignty.86
The reference to the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the is-
sue relates to that court's March 2008 decision in Chicago Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc. ,87
noted above.88 Specifically, the Does relied on the court's stated
understanding that "Section 230(c) as a whole cannot be under-
stood as a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators
and other online content hosts."89 In fact, the Does argued "the
truly limited view of Section 230 confines its application to those
cases in which the plaintiff brings a claim sounding in defamation
that seeks to impose traditional 'publisher' liability on an interac-
tive service provider."90
A. Beyond Defamation: Immunity for Other Statutory Violations
In Lawyers' Committee, the court of appeals agreed that
Congress did not contemplate the fair housing law when it created
the immunity under § 230, but noted "the reason a legislature writes
a general statute is to avoid any need to traipse through the United
States Code and consider all potential sources of liability, one at a
time."9' Parsed differently, the question is not whether Congress
meant to include any particular law; rather, the correct question is
whether it specifically excluded any act from the law's reach.
92
86. Reply in Supp. of Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., No.
08-340, 2008 WL 4757420, at *12 (Oct. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Reply].
87. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
88. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
89. Lawyers' Committee, 519 F.3d at 669.
90. Reply, supra note 86, at *9.
91. Lawyers' Committee, 519 F.3d at 671.
92. Id.
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A second § 230 case involving the fair housing laws decided
in 2008 is distinguishable from Lawyers' Committee, and the points
of distinction are instructive in determining where immunity ends
and liability begins. The case perhaps gives some insight into how
courts may find ways to assist plaintiffs when an online service aids
in violation of a law. For the Ninth Circuit, the issue was not
whether § 230 protection applies in anti-discrimination cases. In-
stead, the question was how responsible the Roommates website
was for creating the discriminatory advertisements that appeared
on it. 93 The service works by matching "people renting out spare
rooms with people looking for a place to live ' , 94 or, as the court de-
scribed the operation:
Before subscribers can search listings or post
housing opportunities on Roommate's website,
they must create profiles, a process that re-
quires them to answer a series of questions. In
addition to requesting basic information-such
as name, location and email address-
Roommate requires each subscriber to disclose
his sex, sexual orientation and whether he
would bring children to a household. Each
subscriber must also describe his preferences in
roommates with respect to the same three cri-
teria: sex, sexual orientation and whether they
will bring children to the household.95
Chief Judge Alex Kozinksi noted that the case would re-
quire the court to "plumb the depths of the immunity provided by
section 230."96 To be clear, the court suggested that a single entity
could act as both a content provider and an ISP.97 The court ob-
served that if the ISP "passively displays content that is created en-
tirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with respect
93. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
94. Id. at 1161.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1162.
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to that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or is 'respon-
sible, in whole or in part' for creating or developing, the website is
also a content provider.,
98
When the service provider elicits responses through its
online options that give rise to discriminatory (i.e., illegal) con-
tent,99 it moves beyond the § 230 protection contemplated by Con-
gress. At that point, it shares the content creation with the users
who are choosing among the options provided. The court hastened
to point out "the fact that users are information content providers
does not preclude Roommate from also being an information con-
tent provider by helping 'develop' at least 'in part' the information
in the profiles." 100
Not all First Amendment lawyers were troubled by the
court's decision in Roommates. Speaking to the attendees at the
Practising Law Institute's "Communications Law in the Digital
Age" forum in November 2008, Gannett Company, Inc.'s vice
president and associate general counsel Barbara W. Wall said "she
98. Id. (quoting Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1262
(N.D. Cal. 2006)).
99. Id. at 1165. The court noted, for example:
Roommate requires subscribers to specify, using a drop-
down menu provided by Roommate, whether they are
"Male" or "Female" and then displays that information
on the profile page. Roommate also requires subscribers
who are listing available housing to disclose whether there
are currently "Straight male(s)," "Gay male(s),"
"Straight female(s)" or "Lesbian(s)" living in the dwell-
ing. Subscribers who are seeking housing must make a se-
lection from a drop-down menu, again provided by
Roommate, to indicate whether they are willing to live
with "Straight or gay" males, only with "Straight" males,
only with "Gay" males or with "No males." Similarly,
Roommate requires subscribers listing housing to disclose
whether there are "Children present" or "Children not
present" and requires housing seekers to say "I will live
with children" or "I will not live with children." Room-
mate then displays these answers, along with other infor-
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is 'heartened' by the Roommates.com decision, rather than seeing it
as a 'threat' to Section 230."''° Specifically, she took comfort in the
fact that "[a]s distinguished from other cases, by requiring answers
to its questions, 'roommates.com turned your computer into [a Fair
Housing Act] violation machine." ''  2 In short, Wall's comfort level
with the decision is based upon the fact that the questions asked by
the service would be illegal to ask in other contexts. Thus, it is not
a stretch to make it illegal online. Undoubtedly, many First
Amendment advocates would concede that plaintiffs have the right
to pursue actions against the content generators-provided they
can locate them. This gives rise to the burgeoning sidebar to the §
230 story: Can litigants use traditional discovery techniques to lo-
cate potential defendants?
III. UNMASKING PUBLIUS: USING SUBPOENAS TO IDENTIFY
ANONYMOUS POSTERS
While § 230 shields ISPs from lawsuits arising out of third-
party content, clearly the third parties themselves remain fair game
for litigation. The recurring problem for plaintiffs is identifying
who the message originator is-especially because so much of the
speech at issue is anonymous. That fact also raises the specter of
the First Amendment because, as one federal court framed the is-
sue, "[t]he right to speak anonymously extends to speech via the
Internet. Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far
ranging exchange of ideas."' 3
Indeed, anonymous speech is not a new phenomenon,0 4 but
the Internet has changed the nature of such communication consid-
101. Net-Based Libel Cases in 2008 Define Boundaries of CDA Immu-
nity, 36 Med. L. Rep. 2537, 2537-68 (Dec. 9, 2008), available at
http://medialaw.bna.com/medw/display/batch-print-display.adp.
102. Id.
103. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
104. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342
(1995) (noting that "an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other de-
cisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an
aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment"); Talley
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erably, given that "[t]he poster's message not only is transmitted in-
stantly to other subscribers to the message board, but potentially is
passed on to an expanding network of recipients, as readers may
copy, forward, or print those messages to distribute to others.'
0 5
With technological advancements also comes the opportunity-
indeed the greater likelihood, given the expansive system-for
more widespread distribution of misinformation, but courts none-
theless often have found that the value of allowing such speech
outweighs the potential for adverse consequences.
The rationale for protecting anonymous speech has been ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court. In McIntyre v. Ohio Election
Commission, 10 the Court observed,
The decision in favor of anonymity may be mo-
tivated by fear of economic or official retalia-
tion, by concern about social ostracism, or
merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation
may be, at least in the field of literary en-
deavor, the interest in having anonymous
works enter the marketplace of ideas unques-
tionably outweighs any public interest in re-
quiring disclosure as a condition of entry.107
Similarly, other courts have found that anonymous speech
helps to level the playing field for expressive purposes, suggesting
that, "by concealing speakers' identities, the online forum allows
individuals of any economic, political, or social status to be heard
without suppression or other intervention by the media or more
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (suggesting "[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaf-
lets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress
of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout his-
tory have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anony-
mously or not at all.").
105. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 237 (Ct. App. 2008) (warning
that "no one is truly anonymous on the Internet, even with the use of a pseu-
donym" because ISPs can trace posters' identities).
106. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
107. Id. at 341-42.
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powerful figures in the field."1 °8 Likewise, in Doe v. Cahill,"9 the
Delaware Supreme Court observed,
The internet is a unique democratizing medium
unlike anything that has come before. The ad-
vent of the internet dramatically changed the
nature of public discourse by allowing more
and diverse people to engage in public debate.
Unlike thirty years ago, when "many citizens
[were] barred from meaningful participation in
public discourse by financial or status inequali-
ties, and a relatively small number of powerful
speakers [could] dominate the marketplace of
ideas" the internet now allows anyone with a
phone line to "become a town crier with a voice
that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox."1
Courts generally have been respectful of the role anony-
mous speech played throughout history, particularly in establishing
the U.S. Constitution, noting specifically that "[t]hroughout the
revolutionary and early federal period in American history,
anonymous speech and the use of pseudonyms were powerful tools
of political debate. The Federalist Papers (authored by Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay) were written anonymously under the name
'Publius."".... Participating in democracy does not require self-
identification, and that has a value in itself. "The 'ability to speak
one's mind' on the Internet 'without the burden of the other party
knowing all the facts about one's identity can foster open communi-
cation and robust debate."'' " 2
108. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 237.
109. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
110. Id. at 455 (quoting Lyrissa Narnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 894 (2000); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
111. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash
2001) (noting that "[t]he anti-federalists responded with anonymous articles of
their own, authored by 'Cato' and 'Brutus,' among others").
112. Id. (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573,
578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).
20091
Nonetheless, the question remains: Should a person or en-
tity that is defamed or otherwise injured by an anonymous poster
have an opportunity to learn the identity of that poster through the
ordinary tools of litigation? Section 230 closes the door, in most in-
stances, on holding the ISP accountable, but should the ISP be
forced to cooperate with a subpoena designed with the specific in-
tent of revealing identifying information about the poster? Courts
continue to struggle with this issue, and most are treading carefully
through this legal thicket, recognizing, as this U.S. district court did,
that
[t]he free exchange of ideas on the Internet is
driven in large part by the ability of Internet
users to communicate anonymously. If Inter-
net users could be stripped of that anonymity
by a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal
rules of civil discovery, this would have a sig-
nificant chilling effect on Internet communica-
tions and thus on basic First Amendment
rights. Therefore, discovery requests seeking to
identify anonymous Internet users must be sub-
jected to careful scrutiny by the courts.113
Courts handling the subpoena question could opt for apply-
ing standard rules of civil discovery, but this clearly would under-
mine anonymous speech on the Internet. Instead, requiring a
heightened standard when litigants issue a subpoena-clearly the
emerging trend-in an attempt to unmask anonymous posters pro-
vides a balance of First Amendment interests and helps to ensure
113. Id. at 1093-94. The court observed:
In the context of a civil subpoena issued pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 45, this Court must determine when and un-
der what circumstances a civil litigant will be permitted to
obtain the identity of persons who have exercised their
First Amendment right to speak anonymously. There is
little in the way of persuasive authority to assist this
Court. However, courts that have addressed related is-
sues have used balancing tests to decide when to protect
an individual's First Amendment rights.
200 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 8
SEX, LIES, AND THE INTERNET
fairness for parties and potential parties. In Dendrite International,
Inc. v. Doe No. 3,114 one of the early cases to address the subpoena
issue, the court offered a prescription for handling subpoenas on
ISPs seeking the identity of posters:
The trial court must consider and decide those
applications by striking a balance between the
well-established First Amendment right to
speak anonymously, and the right of the plain-
tiff to protect its proprietary interests and repu-
tation through the assertion of recognizable
claims based on the actionable conduct of the
anonymous, fictitiously-named defendants. 15
Specifically, the court outlined a four-part approach "based
on a meaningful analysis and a proper balancing of the equities and
rights at issue."' 116 The four parts of this balancing analysis are as
follows:
9 The plaintiff must "undertake efforts to notify the anony-
mous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application
for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford the ficti-
tiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and
serve opposition to the application.' 17
* The plaintiff must "identify and set forth the exact state-
ments purportedly made by each anonymous poster that plaintiff
alleges constitutes actionable speech."'18
* "[T]he plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence support-
ing each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior
to a court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed de-
fendant."119
- "[T]he court must balance the defendant's First Amend-
ment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the
114. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001).
115. Id. at 760.
116. Id. at 761.
117. Id. at 760 (setting out further that "[t]hese notification efforts should
include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request to
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prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of
the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to prop-
erly proceed."
1 20
Other courts have adopted a similar balancing approach. In
121Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., the district court set out the four fac-
tors required before ordering the identities of anonymous posters
who are not parties to the lawsuit, finding that "non-party disclo-
sure is only appropriate in the exceptional case where the compel-
ling need for the discovery sought outweighs the First Amendment
rights of the anonymous speaker":
122
[T]his Court adopts the following standard for
evaluating a civil subpoena that seeks the iden-
tity of an anonymous Internet user who is not a
party to the underlying litigation. The Court
will consider four factors in determining
whether the subpoena should issue. These are
whether: (1) the subpoena seeking the informa-
tion was issued in good faith and not for any
improper purpose, (2) the information sought
relates to a core claim or defense, (3) the iden-
tifying information is directly and materially
relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) in-
formation sufficient to establish or to disprove
that claim or defense is unavailable from any
other source.123
In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,124 Maryland's
case of first impression discussed briefly in the Introduction, the
court of appeals explained that it "granted certiorari in this case not
merely to sort out the record, but to provide guidance to the trial
courts in defamation actions, when the disclosure of the identity of
120. Id. at 760-61 (assuming that "the plaintiff has presented a prima fa-
cie cause of action").
121. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
122. Id. at 1095 (observing that "[wihen the anonymous Internet user is
not a party to the case, the litigation can go forward without the disclosure of
their identity").
123. Id.
124. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009).
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an anonymous Internet communicant is sought."'' 2 5 Further, the
court "recognize[d] the complexity of the decision to order disclo-
sure regarding pseudonyms or user-names in the context of the
First Amendment. 1 26 In the end, however, the state's high court
borrowed from "the standards employed by many of [its] sister
courts"'127 in fashioning Maryland's five-part rule, which says trial
courts "confronted with a defamation action in which anonymous
speakers or pseudonyms are involved" should:
(1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to
notify the anonymous posters that they are the
subject of a subpoena or application for an or-
der of disclosure, including posting a message
of notification of the identity discovery request
on the message board; (2) withhold action to
afford the anonymous posters a reasonable op-
portunity to file and serve opposition to the
application; (3) require the plaintiff to identify
and set forth the exact statements purportedly
made by each anonymous poster, alleged to
constitute actionable speech; (4) determine
whether the complaint has set forth a prima fa-
cie defamation per se or per quod action
against the anonymous posters; and (5), if all
else is satisfied, balance the anonymous
poster's First Amendment right of free speech
against the strength of the prima facie case of
defamation presented by the plaintiff and the
necessity for disclosure of the anonymous de-
fendant's identity, prior to ordering disclo-
sure. 128
Although courts are struggling to establish the appropriate
balance in this new area, they recognize that "anonymity or pseu-
125. Id. at 449.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 456 (alteration in original).
128. Id. at 457 (citing Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-
61 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001)).
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donymity has been a part of the Internet culture"' 129 since the outset
and preserving those qualities, given the "magnitude of the protec-
tion of anonymous speech under the First Amendment,"'"3 is criti-
cal to the future of speech on the Internet.
A. "CyberSLAPPs" as a Threat to Anonymous Speech
The good-faith requirement set out by the district court in
Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., discussed above, should not be over-
looked. Indeed, there is growing concern that some companies are
using subpoenas as "weapons" against people who speak out on
Internet financial message boards or chat rooms. So called "Cy-
berSLAPPs ' attempt to "silence their anonymous critics on the
129. Id. at 438.
130. Id. at 441.
131. SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
For a discussion of SLAPP, see California Anti-SLAPP Project,
http://www.casp.net/slapps/mengen.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). SLAPPs
are:
civil complaints or counterclaims (against either an indi-
vidual or an organization) in which the alleged injury was
the result of petitioning or free speech activities protected
by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
SLAPPs are often brought by corporations, real estate
developers, or government officials and entities against
individuals who oppose them on public issues. Typically,
SLAPPs are based on ordinary civil tort claims such as
defamation, conspiracy, and interference with prospective
economic advantage. While most SLAPPs are legally
meritless, they effectively achieve their principal purpose:
to chill public debate on specific issues. Defending a
SLAPP requires substantial money, time, and legal re-
sources and thus diverts the defendant's attention away
from the public issue. Equally important, however, a
SLAPP also sends a message to others: you, too, can be
sued if you speak up.
Id. See also CyberSLAPP.org, http://www.cyberslapp.org/ (last visited Sept. 5,
2009). CyberSLAPP.org describes a "CyberSLAPP" as:
involv[ing] a person who has posted anonymous criticisms
of a corporation or public figure on the Internet. The tar-
get of the criticism then files a frivolous lawsuit just so
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boards and intimidate other Internet users to keep their criticisms
to themselves." '132 The pattern includes issuing subpoenas against
ISPs in an effort to reveal the identities of the anonymous posters,
but the impact of the procedural device goes beyond the stated law-
suit: "The free give-and-take of discussion on the boards is also af-
fected. Because users may fear being sued if they criticize the com-
pany, they may tone down their criticism or say nothing at all."'3
The good news for targets of CyberSLAPPs, at least in the
twenty-nine states that have dealt with the issue by either statute or
case law,3 4 is that they can defend the lawsuit under their state's
anti-SLAPP law. These measures are typically designed to bring
about a quick disposition of the case believed to be a SLAPP, im-
munize the comments of the citizens who have spoken out and al-
low for attorneys fees and costs if the court determines that the law-
suit was filed for a nefarious purpose (i.e., to retaliate against
someone or shut off discussion in a community).135 Importantly,
these laws often require that discovery be stayed while the court
considers the early motions to strike the lawsuit.136
they can issue a subpoena to the Web site or Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) involved, discover the identity of their
anonymous critic, and intimidate or silence them.
Id.
132. California Anti-SLAPP Project, CyberSLAPPs: Company lawsuits
against anonymous Internet posters, http://www.casp.net/slapps
cyberslapp.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
133. Id.
134. See California Anti-SLAPP Project, Other States: Statutes and
Cases, http://casp.net.statutes/menstate.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2009) (noting
the states with anti-SLAPP statutes are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Washington, while Colorado and West Virginia have created
protections through case law).
135. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (providing for a claim
"arising from 'act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.').
136. Id. § 425.16(g).
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Amid rising concerns about potential CyberSLAPPs, Cali-
fornia took the bold defensive step of enacting protections against
subpoenas for "personally identifying information" when the un-
derlying lawsuit involves the exercise of free speech rights.'37 Cali-
fornia Assembly member Paul Krekorian, the primary sponsor of
the measure, noted in a press release that CyberSLAPPs require
special attention: "As greater numbers of Californians are turning
to the Internet to speak out on controversial issues, their freedom
to express themselves anonymously must be protected from power-
ful parties who threaten and use oppressive litigation tactics to stifle
criticism and dissenting views.'
138
When California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed
the bill into law in October 2008, the Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion 13 observed on its "Deeplinks Blog" that:
[o]ne of the most pernicious threats to anonym-
ity is the filing of trumped-up lawsuits as an ex-
cuse to force ISPs to reveal speakers' identities.
Once such a lawsuit is filed, speakers who want
to protect their anonymity must find a way to
pay a lawyer to go to court and prevent disclo-
sure of their personal information. That can be
a real hardship-in fact, even the threat of hav-
ing to go to court may discourage many people
from speaking out in the first place.
140
137. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1987.1(b)(5) (noting that "[a] person
whose personally identifying information . . . is sought in connection with an
underlying action involving that person's exercise of free speech rights" may
seek a protective order from a court. The law went into effect Jan. 1, 2009.).
138. Press Release, Assistant Majority Leader Paul Krekorian, Kre-
korian Bill to Protect Freedom of Speech on the Internet Passes Senate
Comm. (July 2, 2008), http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a43/News-
Room/press/20080702AD43PR02.aspx.
139. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/about (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009) (describing how "EFF broke new ground when it was
founded in 1990-well before the Internet was on most people's radar-and
continues to confront cutting-edge issues defending free speech, privacy, inno-
vation, and consumer rights today").
140. Posting of Corynne McSherry to Deeplinks Blog, California Gover-
nor Signs Off On New Protections for Free Speech,
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California was a leader in enacting anti-SLAPP laws in the
early 1990s, so it's not surprising that the state would be out front in
fighting the next iteration of these lawsuits that pose a serious
threat to free speech.
141
B. Shielding Bloggers under Journalistic Privilege Laws
While California law protects against subpoenas in Cyber-
SLAPP cases to reveal the identity of critics, newspapers that host
blogs now have another tool in combating similar "fishing expedi-
tions": shield laws.142 Statutes shielding journalists from having to
disclose information in official proceedings-now found in thirty-
six states143-"vary, often substantially, from state to state."'
144
Nonetheless, the use of shield laws to keep confidential the identity
of anonymous posters to newspaper blogs, though a novel and nas-
cent concept, was allowed by trial courts in at least three states in
2008.
In October 2008, the Circuit Court in Okaloosa County,
Florida, ruled that the Florida Shield Law 141 protected the records
custodian/webmaster at the Florida Freedom, a daily newspaper
serving the area, from having "to appear and produce information
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/10/california-governor-signs-new-
protections-free-spe (Oct. 2, 2008).
141. See RICHARDS, supra note 24, at 20 (describing the early process of
passing anti-SLAPP legislation in California).
142. See DON R. PEMBER & CLAY CALVERT, MASS MEDIA LAw 637
(2009-2010 ed. 2008) (describing shield laws as "[s]tate statutes that permit re-
porters in some circumstances to shield the name of a confidential news source
when questioned by a grand jury or in another legal forum").
143. See generally The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
Privilege Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/ (last visited Oct. 16,
2009) (discussing laws on the reporters' privileges in each state).
144. C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 969
(1998) (noting that "[s]ome statutes extend their protections to those persons
,engaged in newspaper, radio or television journalism,' while others apply to
any person 'regularly engaged in the business of collecting or writing news for
publication, or presentation to the public, through a news organization"') (ci-
tations omitted).
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999).
2009] 207
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
and records related to an Internet poster to Florida Freedom's web-
site including, but, not limited to, the user's e-mail and IP addresses
and other identifying information."' 46
In quashing the subpoena, the court noted that the webmas-
ter "was at all material times a professional journalist employed by"
the newspaper. 147 Under Florida's statute, a "[p]rofessional jour-
nalist" is someone who regularly "engage[s] in collecting, photo-
graphing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing news,
for gain or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while
working as a salaried employee of, or independent contractor for, a
newspaper, news journal, news agency, press association, wire ser-
vice, radio or television station, network, or news magazine."'
148
Interestingly, the privilege extends to "information, includ-
ing the identity of any source, that the professional journalist has
obtained while actively gathering news."'149  Accordingly, for the
court to stretch the privilege to cover the situation where an
anonymous website visitor posts to a newspaper's blog, it had to
find that the definition of newsgathering sweeps up the unchecked
postings of third parties. Stated differently, by posting to a newspa-
per's blog rather than other available sites, a third-party poster may
receive a layer of protection under a statute that originally was de-
signed to protect journalists who rely upon confidential sources in
the process of reporting the news. Moreover, the court applied the
test that a party must show to overcome the privilege and found
that the individual seeking the identity of the Internet poster "failed
to meet the burden."'
150
146. Beal v. Calobrisi, No. 08-CA-1075, slip op. at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9,
2008).
147. Id.
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (a).
149. Id. § 90.5015(2) (emphasis added).
150. Beal at 2. The test requires a three-part showing to overcome the
privilege: "(a) The information is relevant and material to unresolved issues
that have been raised in the proceeding for which the information is sought;
(b) The information cannot be obtained from alternative sources; and (c) A
compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the information." §
90.5015(2).
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Similarly, in Oregon, Clackamas County Circuit Court
Judge Pro Tern James E. Redman ruled that "[t]he Oregon Media
Shield Law is broadly written and it is intended to protect a broad
range of media activity, not simply news gathering.''. The plaintiff
sought to compel "the production of information helpful to identify
the authors of anonymous web blog comments" from two web
hosts, Willamette Week and Portland Mercury."' The judge found
that both hosts fell "within the purview" of Oregon's shield law,
which applies to persons "connected with, employed by or engaged
in any medium of communication to the public." 53
The judge used the portion of the statute that protected
"[t]he source of any published or unpublished information obtained
by the person in the course of gathering, receiving or processing in-
formation for any medium of communication to the public."15 4 The
court noted that the plaintiff would have the court read the lan-
guage "in the course of gathering ... information" to be "synony-
mous with 'in the course of gathering news"" 55 and thus not appli-
cable to the anonymous posting scenario. Judge Redman declined
to read the statute that narrowly, saying that "[i]t would seem clear
that Oregon's Media Shield Law is intended to have a wider scope
than 'news gathering."
'1 56
When news organizations host blogs, they often do so in
conjunction with their own reporting. A post on the Portland Mer-
cury's blog entitled "Busy Day at City Hall, Part 2" discussed a
mayoral candidate's actions to secure public financing for his cam-
paign and invited readers to post comments on the blog. 157 An
151. Letter from James E. Redman, Clackamas County Cir. Ct. J., Pro
Tem, to Daniel Skerritt, Attorney at Law, Kevin Kono, Attorney at Law, and
Jessica Goldman, Attorney at Law (Sept. 30, 2008) (outlining the Doe v. T.S.,
Case No. CV08030693 ruling) (on file with author).
152. Id.
153. Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520 (2007).
154. OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1)(a).
155. See Letter from James E. Redman, supra note 151, at 2.
156. Id.
157. Posting of Amy J. Ruiz to Blogtown, PDX,
http://blogtown.portandmercury.com/2008/01/busy-day-at-city-hall-part_2.p
hp (Jan. 31, 2008, 17:22 PST).
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anonymous poster named "Ronald" responded with a comment
that was allegedly defamatory.158
The court microparsed the shield law's protection, finding
that if "the comment had been totally unrelated to the blog post,
then the argument could be made that the Portland Mercury did
not receive it in the 'course of gathering, receiving, or processing
information for any medium of communication to the public.1'
1 59
Under the circumstances, however, the statute applied.
In a third case, in Montana, a one-time politician tried to
force the Billings Gazette to turn over identifying information about
posters to the newspaper's blog who used the pseudonyms "Always
Wondering," "High Plains Drifter," and "CutiePie."' 60 As in the
cases discussed above, the newspaper sought protection from the
subpoena under Montana's shield law, known as the "Media Confi-
dentiality Act. 1 61 The language of Montana's shield law has a
broad sweep and states that no one who is involved in "gathering,
writing, editing, or disseminating news may be examined as to or
may be required to disclose any information obtained or prepared
or the source of that information in any legal proceeding if the in-
formation was gathered, received, or processed in the course of his
employment or its business.'
162
The Billings Gazette argued, in moving to quash the sub-
poena, "that the on-line message service is indeed part of the Ga-
zette's business ... an integral part of the business and a growing
part of the business.,
163
Judge G. Todd Baugh agreed that the statute is expansive
enough to encompass anonymous posters to the newspaper's web-
site. In ruling from the bench, he noted that:
158. See Letter from James E. Redman, supra note 151, at 2.
159. Id. (noting that "[t]his court feels compelled to follow the broad
statutory language in regard to plaintiff's motion to compel and therefore de-
nies plaintiff's motion to compel").
160. Transcript of Motion to Quash at 11, Doty v. Molnar, Cause No.
DV 07-022 (Mont. 13th Jud. Dist. Sept. 3, 2008) (on file with author).
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-901 (2007).
162. Id. § 26-1-902(1).
163. Transcript of Motion to Quash, supra note 160, at 4 (on file with au-
thor).
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the Court doesn't even get to the constitutional
issue that the legislature has already decided..
. with this statute. And though technology has
advanced since the time of the creation of that
law, it, nonetheless, is very broad and it does
cover the situation we have here before us to-
day. 164
While the use of shield law protections to avoid unmasking
anonymous posters to a media organization's blog is a recent phe-
nomenon, it has captured the attention of media lawyers and thus
promises to grow in popularity. The respected media law firm of
Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, L.L.P. 165 reported on the practice in
a recent newsletter to clients and other interested parties in an up-
date article entitled, "How to Respond to Subpoenas Seeking to
Unmask Anonymous Internet Posters."' 166 In informing clients
about how subpoenas may be challenged, the article observed that
"[u]nder certain circumstances, media companies can challenge a
subpoena seeking identifying information. For example, companies
might ask a court to quash a subpoena based on the speaker's con-
stitutional rights, federal and state statutory law, the reporter's privi-
lege, or the court's lack of jurisdiction.
167
IV. ANALYSIS
BALANCING FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS AND PERSONAL
HARM IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION
Unquestionably, the law regarding the insulation of ISPs
from lawsuits stemming from third-party content is a work in pro-
gress. The latest trends indicate that the standard discovery tool for
164. Id. at 29.
165. Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, L.L.P., http://www.lskslaw.com (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009) (describing itself as "[a] national law firm providing rep-
resentation to publishers, broadcasters, media companies, creative profession-
als and other content providers in the news, information and entertainment
industries").
166. 2 MEDIA LAW NEWS 3 (2008) (on file with author).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
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compelling ISPs to turn over identifying information about the
third-party poster-the subpoena-presents ancillary (yet critical)
issues that may undermine long-established free speech principles,
such as the right to speak anonymously. On the other hand, the
ability to disseminate potentially damaging and false information
about another to a mass audience with little more than a key-
stroke's worth of effort threatens to devalue reputation to a point
never before experienced in American culture.
The question then becomes: is there a way to balance the
First Amendment rights of ISPs and posters with the reputational
interests of those who allegedly are harmed by the online material?
Any such balancing would require a revision of the blanket immu-
nity under § 230 and thus portends a statutory solution. Necessar-
ily, any such congressional action must contemplate choices that
would be freely elected by the parties involved. What follows is a
proposed template for achieving that balance while maintaining, to
the fullest extent possible, the First Amendment safeguards for
online speech. It maps out a process for handling a variety of situa-
tions that often arise with online postings.
At the outset, it is important to point out that no section of
the proposed solution outlined below imposes an affirmative obli-
gation on the ISP to police content on its site-an unduly burden-
some, if not crippling, task. Any requirement forcing the ISP to act
would be triggered only by the individual alleging harm arising out
of the information posted on the site-with appropriate safeguards
against frivolous claims and likely "fishing expeditions."
A. Status Quo: The Identity of the Poster is Readily Available
In situations in which the identity of the online poster is ap-
parent, the only recourse for the aggrieved party is to file a law-
suit-if an actionable claim exists-against the third-party content
provider. Section 230 insulation from claims, under such circum-
stances, would remain firmly in place for the ISP.
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B. Anonymous Posters: Identifying Information Available Only
to Internet Service Provider
If the posting at issue comes from a third-party who has
posted anonymously or by using a pseudonym, then the aggrieved
party has the affirmative obligation to contact the ISP and provide
notice of the exact posting(s) that give rise to legally actionable ma-
terial (defamation, privacy, or other violations of law). Once noti-
fied of legally actionable material, the ISP has several choices-
each of which would affix certain liabilities, rights, and responsibili-
ties.
i.Refusal to Act
The first choice for the ISP is simply to do nothing. If the
ISP chooses this option, the immunity currently available under §
230 may dissolve and the ISP could be subject to legal action as if it
were the provider of the content at issue. Nonetheless, even under
such circumstances, the ISP would still have all of the usual de-
fenses that any publisher of information would have available to it
under federal and state constitutions, statutory, and common law.
Additional protection is warranted. Thus, if it is determined
that the legal action taken against the ISP and poster (if eventually
identified and added to the lawsuit) was not carried out in good
faith (i.e., there is no legitimate cause of action or the action was
initiated for sham purposes), the ISP would be entitled to an expe-
dited disposition of the case (e.g., a motion to strike staying discov-
ery) and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, similar to the way
anti-SLAPP laws operate in the states that have enacted them. Ac-
cordingly, an ISP that correctly believes the material in question is
protected speech can defend a lawsuit without fear of burdensome
costs.
ii. Process to Retain Insulation Against Legal Action
To retain for itself the immunity currently available under §
230, the ISP must contact the unidentified poster and offer the op-
portunity to remove the posting within a statutorily defined period
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of time (say, ten days). 168 If the poster consents to removal, or if
the ISP decides to do so on its own, immunity attaches to the ISP,
and no cause of action may follow against it.
Moreover, if the poster refuses removal, and the ISP does
not do so on its own, but cooperates fully with any subpoena or or-
der of court to reveal identifying information available to it about
the poster, the ISP will be immune from any liability.
iii.Piercing the "Virtual" Veil
If the poster does not consent to removal and the ISP does
not remove the content on its own, then the aggrieved party may
proceed against both the ISP and the unidentified poster as a
"Doe" defendant. If the aggrieved party issues a subpoena or a
court orders disclosure and the ISP challenges such disclosure,
161
then the case proceeds against both the ISP and the poster. In this
situation, the traditional defenses against the cause(s) of action will
come into play. Moreover, as in the case in which the ISP does
nothing, if it is shown that the plaintiff did not act in good faith in
pursuing the lawsuit, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs are avail-
able to the ISP. Insofar as the subpoena challenge is concerned,
Congress should codify a version of the tests set forth by the several
courts that examined this issue. In all such cases, the ISP should
take reasonable steps to notify the poster that a subpoena has been
issued in order that the poster be afforded the opportunity to chal-
168. Some legal commentators have proposed "notice and takedown"
provisions similar to those found in the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 512(c) & 512(d) (2006). See Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab,
Does Liability Enhance Credibility?: Lessons from the DMCA Applied to
Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237,265 (2007) (proposing
an "Online Defamation Limited Liability Act" in which "once an ISP receives
written notice of an allegedly defamatory statement pursuant to a statutory
notice requirement, the ISP would have to take down the defamatory materi-
als for a finite period of time, such as ten to fourteen days"). This differs con-
siderably from the proposal herein, in that in the current proposal, any such
takedown by the ISP is voluntary. Moreover, the scope of the current pro-
posal moves beyond simple defamation cases.
169. As suggested earlier, if the ISP cooperates and reveals identifying
information, immunity attaches to the ISP.
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lenge the subpoena. The ISP would have that same opportunity.
The following hybrid of the judicially-created tests, which establish
a heightened standard, would serve to balance the interests of the
parties:
* The court must examine the statements at issue in the
complaint to see if there is a prima facie showing that a violation of
law exists. Clearly, this determination relates to the good-faith re-
quirement outlined above.
9 The court must be satisfied that the information sought by
the subpoena is necessary to prove a core claim or defense in the
case.
* The information sought is not available from any other
source.
The full range of privileges currently available in the law-
reporter's privilege included 70-would remain available where ap-
plicable.
CONCLUSION
It is no stretch to argue that Congress never envisioned the
full range of messages to which § 230 has applied for more than a
dozen years. It is also not surprising that given the proliferation of
blogs and social networking sites-the seemingly countless oppor-
tunities to post damaging information online anonymously-there
have been calls for reforms and frustration with the current system
that affords little opportunity for those claiming legitimate harms
from online messages. Nonetheless, to scrap ISP immunity alto-
gether would be a devastating move that would undermine the use-
fulness and future growth of the Internet. Moreover, blithely allow-
ing the revelation of anonymous online posters' identities would
undercut a tradition of free speech in this country that dates back to
the nation's founding.
The only reasonable way to address the situation is to mod-
ify the existing law in such a way as to require a heightened stan-
dard on the part of those seeking redress, yet leave open the oppor-
170. See supra notes 142-167 and accompanying text (discussing a shield
for bloggers under laws that grant privileges to journalists).
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tunity for recourse in situations where complainants meet that high
threshold. The proposal outlined above allows for potential liabil-
ity against the ISP only in the situation where an actual cause of ac-
tion exists against the unidentified poster and the ISP has refused to
act in any way.
